Abstract. This paper presents novel bilevel leader-follower portfolio selection models in which the financial intermediary, that becomes a decision-maker, has to decide on the unit price transaction cost for investing in some securities, maximizing its benefits, and the investor has to choose his optimal portfolio, minimizing risk and ensuring a given expected return. One of the main contributions of this paper is that its models incorporate two level of decision-makers: the financial intermediary and the investor; which gives rise to general non linear problems in both levels of the decision process. We present different bilevel versions of the problem: bank-leader, investor-leader and social welfare models and analyze their properties. Moreover, we develop Mixed Integer Linear Programming formulations for some of the proposed models and efficient algorithms for some others. Finally, we report on some computational experiments performed on real data taken from the IBEX 35, the main benchmark stock exchange index of the Spanish stock market, and analyze and compare the results obtained by the different models.
Introduction
The classical model in portfolio optimization was originally proposed by Markowitz in 1952 [16] . This model has served as the initial point for the development of modern portfolio financial theory. Over time, portfolio optimization problems have become more realistic, incorporating real life aspects that make the resulting portfolios more efficient than the alternatives that do not consider them [4, 7, 13, 15] . Transaction costs can be seen as one of these important actual features to be included in portfolio optimization. These costs are those incurred by the investors when buying and selling assets on real financial markets, charged by the brokers or the financial institutions playing the role of intermediary. These commissions/prices/taxes have a direct impact on the portfolio, specially for individual or small investors, since they will determine the net returns, reducing them and decreasing also the budget available for future investments [2, 3] .
To the best of our knowledge, in the existing literature, transaction costs are assumed to be given [13, 15] . They can be a fixed cost applied to each selected security in the portfolio (see e.g. [2, 3, 8, 13, 15, 21, 22] and the references therein); or a variable tax to be paid which depends on the amount invested on each security included in the portfolio. This dependence can be proportional or be given by a set up cost that is only charged if the amount invested exceeds a given threshold, or some other functional form, etcetera, see e.g. [3, 10, 11, 13, 15] and the references therein; but in all these cases, unit transaction costs are known and fixed in the optimization process. Nevertheless, it is meaningful to analyze the situations where transaction costs (unit prices) can be decision variables on financial institutions' hands so that they are set trying to maximize its own profit as part of the decision process that leads to optimal portfolios for investors.
The portfolio optimization problem considered in this paper is based on a single-period model of investment and incorporates a taxation/pricing aspect on the transaction costs. We assume that there are two decision-makers involved in the situation: the investor and the financial institution (that we will call from now on "the bank" for simplicity). At the beginning of a period, an investor allocates the capital among various assets and during the investment period, each asset generates a random rate of return. Moreover, we consider that the bank can charge some taxes on the securities selected by the investor trying to maximize its benefits. At the end of the period, the result for the investor, is a change of the capital invested (increased or decreased) which is measured by the weighted average of the individual rates of return minus taxes. On the other hand, the result for the bank is the amount paid by the investor which depends on the prices set on the traded securities and the portfolio selected by the investor.
The contribution of this paper is to incorporate the above two-levels of decision-makers on portfolio optimization problems: 1) the bank, that will set transaction costs trying to maximize its benefits, and 2) the investor, that will try to optimize its portfolio return, minimizing risk and ensuring a given expected profit, see e.g. [5, 6] for similar approaches for the investor problem. Another interesting contribution of this paper is to consider the unit transaction costs per asset as a decision variable in the problem. As far as we know, models of the portfolio selection that price unit transaction costs have not been considered previously in the literature.
Let N = {1, ..., n} be the set of securities considered for an investment, and B ⊆ N a subset of securities in which the bank can charge transaction costs to the investor. In most cases, B = N , but there is no loss of generality to consider that B is a proper subset of N .
On the one hand, we assume that the bank can price security j ∈ B from a discrete set, with cardinality s j , of admissible prices, P j = {c j1 , ..., c js j }, and the bank's goal is to maximize its benefit. Further, we consider the case in which the price charged by the bank per security is proportional to the amount invested in such security. In other words, the bank's decision variables are unit prices to be charged to the securities. Let x = (x j ) j=1,...,n denote a vector of decision variables: x j being the weight of security j in the portfolio. We only suppose that the invested capital can not exceed the available budget, i.e.
x :
n j=1 x j ≤ 1, x j ≥ 0 forj = 1, ..., n.
Observe that, without loss of generality, we could have assumed that all the capital must be invested. In fact, although we have only assumed budget constraints for the portfolio, the results in this paper can be easily extended to more general situations that consider polyhedral sets of constraints defining the admissible portfolios.
Let us denote by P j the value chosen by the bank to price security j. Then, for a given portfolio x (fixed), the problem faced by the bank can be modeled using the following set of binary decision variables: a jk = 1 if price c jk is assigned to P j , this is, if P j = c jk and a jk = 0 otherwise. Thus, to maximize its profit the bank solves the following problem:
a jk ∈ {0, 1}, j ∈ B, k = 1, ..., s j .
If no further constraint is imposed on prices the above is a valid formulation. However, in general, we will assume without loss of generality that the set of prices for the bank can be restricted to belong to some polyhedron P, allowing P = R |B| + . This can be easily included in the above formulation with the following constraint:
We observe that, if x is known, and constraint (4) is not included, the above problem is easy to solve (see Proposition 3) : the bank will set prices to the maximum ones among those available for each security. Nevertheless, if the portfolio is unknown (to be decided by the investor) or a more general polyhedron is considered, the problem becomes more difficult.
On the other hand, we suppose that the investor wants to reduce the risk of its investment while ensuring a given expected return. At this point several risk measures could be considered, among them variance of returns, Mean Absolute Deviation (MAD), Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR), Gini's Mean Difference, etcetera. (Here, we refer the reader to [12] for further details on the topic.) In this paper we have focused on a portfolio optimization problem based on the CVaR measure. This risk measure aims to avoid large losses: for a specific probability level α, the CVaR measures the conditional expectation of the smallest returns (largest losses) with a cumulative probability α, that is, the average return of the given size (quantile) of worst realizations [12, 19, 20] . Therefore, we assume that the investor's goals are to maximize its CVaR and, at the same time, to ensure that a minimum expected reward µ 0 is obtained with his portfolio. In order to model the above situation, we consider that the rate of return of each security j ∈ N is represented by a random variable R j with a given mean µ j = E(R j ). Each portfolio x defines a random variable R x = n j=1 R j x j that represents the portfolio rate of return (its expected value can be computed as µ(x) = n j=1 µ j x j ). We consider T scenarios, each of them with probability π t , t = 1, ..., T , and assume that for each random variable R j its realization, r jt , under the scenario t is known. Thus, once the bank has set its prices, P , the realization of the portfolio returns R x under scenario t is given as y t = n j=1 r jt x j − i∈B P i x i .
With this information, we assume that our investor wants to maximize the CVaR α , namely the conditional expectation of the smallest returns with cumulated probability α, while ensuring a minimum expected return µ 0 . Thus, the portfolio optimization model that the investor wants to solve can be formulated as:
Observe that the objective function and the set of constraints (5) and (9) model the CVaR (see Mansini et. al [12] for details), whereas (6) gives the expected return in each scenario. Note that, the expected return in each scenario accounts for the net returns, n j=1 r jt x j , minus the transaction costs i∈B P i x i . The sets of constraints (7) and (10) force x to define a portfolio, and finally constraint (8) ensures an expected return of, at least, µ 0 .
There are different ways of accounting for the transaction costs in the literature. For instance, including them in the objective function [1, 17, 22] , subtracting them from the expected return [9, 14] , reducing the capital available for the investment [22] , etcetera (see [15] and the references therein for further details). Among the different options, as it can be seen in the above formulation, we have incorporated the transaction costs in the investor problem subtracting them from the expected profit.
Note also that by choosing different values for parameters α and µ 0 , in the formulation above, different types of investors (i.e. different level of attitude towards risk) can be considered.
Based on the structure of actual financial markets, we assume a hierarchical relationship between the parties involved in the portfolio problem, that is, we consider a natural model in which the bank sets the prices first, trying to anticipate the rational response of the investor. Once the prices are fixed, the investor chooses his optimal portfolio. We also analyze the case in which the investor chooses his portfolio first, and after that, the bank sets the transaction costs. In order to model this hierarchical structure we use a bilevel optimization approach. Furthermore, we consider a social welfare model, that is, a model in which both, bank and investor, cooperate to maximize their returns. We assume in the different models that all economical or financial information is common knowledge and that all the decision-makers in the problem have access to it.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present the model in which the bank is the leader and we develop two different Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) formulations to solve such problem. Section 3 introduces the investor-leader model and develops a Linear Programming (LP) formulation for it if constraint (4) is not included, and an algorithm for more general cases in which generic forms of (4) are considered. Next, in Section 4, it is addressed the social welfare model. There, we propose a MILP formulation and an algorithm based on Benders decomposition for solving the problem. Section 5 is devoted to report on the computational study of the different models discussed in the previous sections. Our results are based on real data taken from IBEX 35, the main benchmark stock exchange index of the Spanish stock market. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
Bilevel Bank-leader Investor-follower Portfolio Problem (BLIFP)
We start analyzing a hierarchical structure in the financial markets in which the bank sets the transaction costs first, and after that the investor chooses his portfolio. Observe that in this situation the problem faced from the point of view of the investor reduces to a portfolio selection, under the considered criterion, which in this case is to hedge against risk maximizing the average α-quantile of his highest loses (CVaR α ). Therefore, we study this situation from the point of view of both the financial intermediary and the investor, simultaneously, which is a novel perspective.
We model the situation as a bilevel leader-follower problem in which the bank has to fix the taxes, from the polyhedral set P ∈ R |B| , maximizing its benefits by assuming that, after its decision is made, the investor will make his decision to optimize his considered criterion.
Using the bilevel optimization framework, the BLIFP can be modeled as follows:
, (6), (7), (8), (9), (10) .
(CVaR Constraints)
Our goal is to solve the above problem to provide answers to the new portfolio optimization model. We propose two different MILP formulations with the aim of making a computational comparison to check which one is more efficient.
Formulation BLIFP1
The main difficulty in handling BLIFP0 is that some of its decision variables are constrained to be optimal solutions of a nested optimization problem. This nestedness property complicates the resolution of the problem. In order to overcome that issue we observe that the follower problem in BLIFP0 is linear on x when P is given. This allows us to compute its exact dual as:
Then, the problem BLIFP0 can be reformulated, applying the strong duality theorem, including the constraints of the primal and dual problem together with the equation that matches the objective values of the follower primal and dual problems. Thus, BLIFP0 is equivalent to solving this new mathematical programming model:
(5), (6) , (7), (8), (9), (10), (CVaR Constraints) (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17) .
For the sake of presentation, we have restricted ourselves to consider the problem with only one follower. However, from a theoretical point of view, the problem with several followers will have a similar structure since their decisions are independent. In the model with F followers, there would be F follower problems, then, the number of follower variables and constraints would be multiplied by F . In this situation the bank's goal would be rather general as maximizing the overall benefit or any other linear function of its prices.
We can observe that in the above formulation we have some bilinear terms, P j x j and P j δ t that appear in constraints (6) and (11), respectively. In order to solve the problem using off-the-shelf solvers, they can be linearized 'a la' McKormick giving rise to another exact MILP formulation for the bilevel problem.
Indeed, since P j = s j k=1 c jk a jk , ∀j ∈ B, we could substitute the terms P j x j = s j k=1 c jkâjk adding variablesâ jk , ∀j ∈ B, k = 1, ..., s j , and the following set of constraints:
Furthermore, this linearization can be simplified. Observe that it is sufficient to include in (BLIFP0) the variablesâ jk and the constraintsâ
from (19) and to substitute the variables x j = s j k=1â jk , ∀j ∈ B. We obtain in this manner an equivalent more compact formulation with the products a jk x j linearized for all j ∈ B, k = 1, ..., s j , with less constraints and decision variables.
Following a similar argument we can linearize the products P j δ t = s j k=1 c jk a jk δ t . To do that, take M a sufficiently large positive number and define the new variablesδ jkt = a jk δ t , ∀j ∈ B, k = 1, ..., s j , t = 1, ..., T . This set of variables together with the following family of constraints linearize all the bilinear terms:
Combining the above elements, all together, we obtain a valid MILP formulation for BLIFP:
The above long formulation can be easily understood once the different sets of constraints are grouped by meaningful blocks. We observe that (2), (3) and (4) are the constraints that define the feasible domain of the bank. Constraint (18) imposes the strong duality condition among the primal and dual formulation of the follower problem. Next, (5), (22) , (23), (8) , (9), (10) and (20) are the constraints that correctly define the linearized version of the CVaR subproblem. Finally, the constraints that come from the linearized version of the dual of the follower problem are (24), (12) , (13), (14), (15), (16), (17) and (21) .
Using these blocks of constraints Problem BLIFP1 can be written in the following compact form. (8), (9), (10), (20), (22), (23), (Linear CVaR Constraints 1) (24), (12) , (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (21) .
This valid formulation of BLIFP1 requires to set a valid value for the big-M constraint. Setting an appropriate value is important to improve the performance of the resulting MIP. In the following we prove the existence of a valid upper bound for such a value. Proposition 1. Let B(P ) be the set of all full rank submatrices of the matrix representing the constraints of problem Dual1 in standard form, where P is a fixed set of prices, and let B S (P) be the matrices that result from B(P ) replacing, one each time, their columns by the RHS of that problem. Moreover, let ∆(P ) := min{|det(B)| : B ∈ B(P )} and ∆ S (P ) = max{|det(B)| : B ∈ B S (P )}.
Proof. It is easy to observe that for each fixed set of prices P , M ≤ max t=1,...,T δ t . Therefore the proof reduces to bound the terms δ t .
From constraint (15) in formulation Dual1 we know that δ t = −γ t − π t µ, ∀t = 1, ..., T, which implies that δ t ≥ 0 for all t = 1, ..., T .
We observe that β + µ 0 µ is bounded for any µ 0 and for any set of prices P (recall that this o.f. gives a CVaR) then, if we denote by r max = max j=1,...,n,t=1,...,T r jt , r min = min j=1,...,n,t=1,...,T r jt and c max = max j=1,...,n, k=1,...,s k c jk , r min − c max ≤ β + µ 0 µ ≤ r max . This implies that the solution of Dual1 is attained at an extreme point and therefore no rays have to be considered. Next, the extreme points of the feasible regions are solutions of systems of full dimensional equations taken from the constraint matrix of Dual1 in standard form. Therefore, applying Cramer's rule we obtain that, at the extreme points, the values of any variable δ t for all t = 1, . . . , T satisfy: δ t ≤ ∆ S (P )/∆(P ). Next, letting P vary on the finite set of possible prices we obtain that δ t ≤ max P ∆ S (P )/∆(P ).
This bound is only of theoretical interest and in our computational experiments we have set it experimentally to be more accurate.
Formulation BLIFP2
In this section, we derive an alternative formulation for BLIFP based on the representation of the prices as P j x j = s j k=1 c jkâjk in the follower problem before its dual problem is obtained. This artifact produces an alternative compact model that we will analyze in the following.
Let us consider the CVaR problem in BLIFP0, and let us linearize the products of variables P i x i , as in the previous formulation. This way we obtain:
Once again, to ease presentation, we write the above formulation in the following compact format. (5), (8), (9), (10), (20), (22)
, (23). (Linear CVaR Constraints 1)
Its dual problem is:
s.t. (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17),
Therefore, we can replace in BLIFP0 the nested optimization problem on the CVaR including the group of constraints in (Linear CVaR Constraints 1) and (12)- (17), (25), (26), that we will referred from now on as (Dual2 Constraints), together with the strong duality condition given by
The combination of all these elements results in the following alternative valid formulation for BLIFP0. (2), (3), (4) (Bank Constraints) (8), (9), (10), (20), (22), (23), (Linear CVaR Constraints 1) (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (25), (26).
(Dual2 Constraints)
The formulation above still contains bilinear terms, namely a jk σ jk , in constraint (27). Therefore, we linearize them as in BLIFP1 and we obtain another valid MILP formulation of BLIFP. (5), (8), (9), (10), (20), (22), (23), (Linear CVaR Constraints 1) (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (25), (26).
Again, this valid formulation for BLIFP2 requires to prove the existence of a valid upper bound for the big-M constraint. In the following we prove that a valid upper bound for such a value does exist. Proposition 2. Let U B δ be the bound obtained in Proposition 1 and
Proof. It is easy to observe that M = max j∈B,k=1,...,s j {σ jk } is a valid upper bound.
Since σ jk is being minimized (it is minimized in Dual2) and it must satisfy constraints (25), there always exists, ∀j ∈ B, k = 1, ..., s j , an optimal solution where these variables assume the values:
As in the Proposition 1, β + µ 0 µ + j∈B s j k=1 a jk σ jk is bounded for any µ o and any fixed set of prices P (since the expression β + µ 0 µ + j∈B s j k=1 a jk σ jk represents a CVaR value). This implies that the solution of Dual2 is achieved at an extreme point and therefore no rays have to be considered. Then, an argument similar to that in Proposition 1 completes the proof.
Bilevel Investor-leader Bank-follower Portfolio Problem (ILBFP)
This section considers the reverse situation to the one that has been analyzed in Section 2, i.e. a hierarchical structure in the financial market where the investor acts first and once its portfolio x is chosen the bank sets prices. This situation leads to a bilevel leader-follower model in which the investor (leader) has to optimize his utility (maximize the CVaR ensuring a given expected reward, µ 0 ) by assuming that once he has chosen the portfolio, the bank (follower) will maximize its benefits deciding on the applicable transaction costs.
We can formulate the problem as:
s.t. (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (CVaR Constraints)
We show in the following result that if no further polyhedral constraints are imposed on prices, i.e. P = R |B| + , fixing the prices to their maximum possible values is always an optimal solution of the follower (bank) problem.
Proposition 3. Let BFP0 be the follower bank problem in the problem ILBFP0. Let x be a given portfolio and let P + j = max k=1,...,s j c jk ∀j ∈ B. Then P + j , ∀j ∈ B is an optimal solution of BFP0.
Proof. Let us consider BFP0. The solution P + j ∀j ∈ B is feasible for the problem.
Let x be a given portfolio vector. Clearly, for any given x the objective value given by j∈B P + j x j can not be improved with any other feasible solution of the bank problem. Hence, this proves the claim.
Using the previous result, the ILBFP0 can be simplified because the nested optimization problem is replaced by the explicit form of an optimal solution. This results in a valid linear programming formulation to solve the problem.
s.t. (5), (7), (8), (9), (10), (CVaR Constraints)
Nevertheless, the above result can not be extended to the case in which a more general polyhedron P defines the admissible set of transaction costs, and a compact MILP formulation can neither be obtained. With the purpose of solving ILBFP, in this more general case, we propose an 'add hoc' algorithm. To justify its validity we need the following result. Theorem 1. Let A = j∈B P j x j , and denote by Ω the set containing the points of the problem in P. The problem ILBFP0 is equivalent to:
Proof. We prove first that, maximizing the objective function η − 1 α
η − y t ≥ 0}. Observe that the constraints in ILBFP-Compact imply that d t = max{0, η − y t } and y t = j∈B r jt x j − j∈B P j x j for all t = 1, ..., T . Therefore the objective value in the problem satisfies:
Secondly, we have that, for a given portfolio x, the optimal valueĀ of the follower problem is
and it is equivalent to evaluate the objective function in all the feasible points and to choose the largest one:
Since C x and A are positive, and A is being minimized in (31), the follower problem in ILBFP0, can be replaced by
and the result follows.
Observe that, if the set of points in Ω were explicitly known, ILBFP-Compact would be a MILP compact formulation with very likely an exponential number of constraints for the general case of ILBFP0. However, the points in the set Ω are usually difficult to enumerate a priori.
The idea of our algorithm is to start with an incomplete formulation of ILBFP-Compact and reinforce it with a new inequality, coming from a new point in Ω, after each new iteration of the algorithm.
Algorithm 1:
Initialization Choose a feasible portfolio x 0 . Set CV aR 0 = +∞ Iteration τ = 1, 2, . . .
• Solve the bank (follower) problem for x τ −1 . Let P τ be an optimal solution.
• Solve the incomplete formulation:
Let x τ be an optimal solution and CV aR τ the optimal value.
-If CV aR τ = CV aR τ −1 . Then, x τ , P τ are optimal solutions of ILBFP0, and CV aR τ the optimal value. END. -Otherwise, go to iteration τ := τ + 1.
Note that since the number of feasible solutions of the bank problem is finite, the finiteness of the algorithm is guaranteed.
The Maximum Social Welfare Problem (MSWP)
In real situations, the investor and the financial institutions may have an incentive to work together to improve the social welfare of the society. They can agree to cooperate and share risk and benefits so as to improve, in this way, their solutions by designing a joint strategy.
We have also analyzed this model for the sake of completeness and to compare the performance of this situation where none of the parties has a hierarchical position over the other one. We think that even if the actual implementation of the cooperative model may be difficult, in a competitive actual market, one may gain some insights on the problem through its analysis.
In this social welfare model we assume that both, financial intermediary and investor, cooperate. If 0 < ξ < 1 denotes the "proportion" of cooperation of each part, the cooperative version of the problem can be written as a weighted sum of the two objective functions of each party in the feasible region delimited by the constraints of both problems: (2), (3), (4), (Bank Constraints) (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10) .
The above problem can be modeled as a MILP problem by linearizing the products of variables a jk x j , ∀j ∈ B following the same linearization as in Section 2:
s.t. (1), (2), (3), (4), (Bank Constraints) (5), (8), (9), (10), (20), (22) Proposition 4. An optimal solution of the unweighted maximum social welfare model induces an objective value that is greater than or equal to the sum of the optimal returns of the two parties in any of the hierarchical models.
Proof. Any feasible solution of BLIFP0 and ILBFP0 is feasible in MSWP0 since all the constraints in this last problem appear in the two former formulations. Therefore, the feasible region of MSWP0 includes the feasible regions of both, BLIFP0 and ILBFP0 and the result follows.
Benders decomposition
We can also obtain a Benders decomposition in order to state a Benders like algorithm to solve MSWP0, and compare the performance of both proposed methods to solve the problem.
Recall that the cooperative model can be written as:
(Bank Constraints) (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10) .
In order to apply Benders decomposition we reformulate MSWP0 as follows:
where
Note that in q(y) we are essentially computing the CVaR for the given solution {y t : t = 1, . . . , T }.
Computing again its dual problem, the evaluation of q(y) can also be obtained as:
Observe that the above problem, which we define as the Primal Problem, is a continuous knapsack problem with lower bounds, therefore it can be solved by inspection. It suffices to sort non-increasingly the y t values and assigning, in that order, to each variable γ t the minimum feasible amount.
Note that in the above formulation the feasible region does not depend on the variables in MSWP', so if we denote by Ω the set of extreme point solutions of the feasible region of PrimalP, q(y) is equivalent to:
Therefore, the problem MSWP0 with discrete prices can be written as:
This analysis allows us to state a Benders algorithm as follows:
Initialization Choose a solution y 0 of the master problem, solve the primal problem PrimalP for the chosen y 0 . Let γ 0 be an optimal solution for PrimalP under y 0 and q(y 0 ) the corresponding optimal value. Take Υ = {γ 0 } and go to iteration τ = 1.
Iteration τ = 1, 2, . . . Solve the master problem MasterP replacing Ω with Υ. Let y * and q * be optimal solutions of such problem.
• If τ = 1 and q(y 0 ) = q * . END.
• If τ > 1 and q(y * ) = q * . END.
• Otherwise, solve the primal problem PrimalP for y = y * . Let γ * be an optimal solution of such problem. Take γ τ = γ * , Υ = Υ ∪ {γ τ }, and go to iteration τ := τ + 1.
Computational study
This section is devoted to report some numerical experiments conducted to: 1) compare the efficiency and effectiveness of the different methods proposed to solve the different model; 2) analyze the form of the solutions within each model, and 3) compare the profiles of the solutions, in terms of net values for the bank and expected return for the investor, across the three developed models.
The computational experiments were carried out on a personal computer with Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2600 CPU, 3.40GHz with 16.0 GB RAM. The algorithms and formulations were implemented and solved by using Xpress IVE 8.0.
In order to conduct the computational study we have considered historical data from IBEX 35. IBEX 35 is the main benchmark stock exchange index of the Spanish stock market. It is made up of the 35 most liquid companies that are listed on the Electronic Spanish Stock Market Interconnection System (SIBE) on the four Spanish stock exchanges (Madrid, Barcelona, Bilbao and Valencia). We took the monthly returns of these 35 companies during the last three years (T = 36 scenarios), and these T historical periods has been considered as equally probable scenarios (π t = 1/T ).
Different types of instances were generated assuming different random sets B of securities in which the bank can charge some taxes. We have consider that this set can have cardinality ranging in |B| = 35, 25, 10. Moreover, we have assumed that the number of different price values s j , for security j ∈ B, is a random value in the interval [0, K] with K = 5, 15, 50. The next table gather the nine different types of instances (A to I) that we considered: In order to generate each type of instance, different profiles of prices were considered. Approximately 15% of the companies in B were given cheap prices; approximately 70% of the companies normal prices, and the rest of securities in B, expensive prices. Based on actual financial market information, cheap prices were generated randomly in the interval [0.001, 0.003], this means that the prices charged by the bank are between the 0.01% and the 0.03% of the invested amount; normal prices, that is, randomly generated in [0.002, 0.008], and expensive prices, generated in the interval [0.006, 0.010].
For each type of instance defined in Table 1 , 5 different instances were solved. Thus, we always report, in all the tables and figures, the average values.
With the purpose of making a richer comparison, different profiles of investors with respect to their risk attitude were also considered varying the values of parameters µ 0 and α. We assumed two thresholds for the expected return µ 0 = −0.1, 0.0. This way, we are modeling investors willing to lose, at most, 10% or 0% of their invested amount. In addition, we consider five different CVaR risk levels, α = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9. Note that the smaller the α, the higher the risk-aversion.
Comparing solution methods
This section compares the computational performance of the different methods proposed to solve each one of the models.
For the first model, BLIFP, we proposed two different formulations: BLIFP1 and BLIFP2. We show in all our tables, the average CPU time expressed in seconds (CPU) and the number of problems (#) solved to optimality (out of 5) for each formulation, with a time limit of 1800 seconds. Table 2 is organized in two blocks of rows. The first block reports results for µ 0 = −0.1 and the second one for µ 0 = 0.0. Each row in the table refers to a type of instance (A, . . . , I). The columns are also organized in five blocks. Each block reports the results for a different risk level α.
It can be observed that BLIFP2 is always faster and it solves a higher number of problems than BLIFP1. For example, when α = 0.1 and µ = 0.0, BLIFP2 is able to solve all the instances of types B, E, F in at most 165 seconds (on average), while BLIFP1 is not able to solve any of these instances. Therefore, we conclude that formulation BLIFP2 is more efficient than BLIFP1 for solving the BLIFP, problem.
The second model in our analysis is the one presented in Section 3, namely ILBFP. For this situation, we have proposed a compact LP formulation ILBFP-LP and the Algorithm 1 to solve the problem. Finally, for MSWP, we have also proposed another compact formulation MSWP0 and a Benders' like algorithm. We report the results concerning these two models in tables 3 and 4, and with the same layout as it was already used in Table 2 . It can be observed that in both models, namely ILBFP and MSWP, the compact formulations are faster than the algorithms. In spite of that, the algorithms are also able to solve the considered instances quickly. For example, in Table 3 , the maximum average time spent by Algorithm 1 to solve any instance is almost negligible and less than one second. Analogously, and in table 4 the maximum average time spent by the Benders' Algorithm for MSWP is less than 11 seconds. 
Comparing solutions and risk profiles within models
This subsection analyzes the results provided by the three models in terms of bank net profit and risk and expected return attained by the investor. 
. , I).
We observe that in BLIFP, the CVaR always increases with the value of α, since this implies to assume more risk. It can also be seen in these figures that, when the value of α increases, the CVaR for µ 0 = −0.1 (left) becomes closer to the CVaR for µ 0 = 0.0 (right). This can be explained because when α = 1, if the constraint that the expected return must be greater or equal to 0 is satisfied, both problems become the same, then, the bigger the α the more similar the results for µ 0 = −0.1 and µ 0 = 0.0. Furthermore, for small values of the level α, the CVaR for µ 0 = −0.1 is higher than for µ 0 = 0.0 because the first constraint on the expected return enlarges the feasible region as compare with the second one. Figure 1 , the bank net profit for different investor's risk profiles. Analogously, Figure 3 represents the expected return for the investor.
We observe in Figure 2 that the results of the bank net profit are bigger for profiles with smaller values of α, that is, for more risk-averse investments. In addition, we also show in Figure 3 that, in general, bigger expected returns are obtained for higher values of α. The reason for this is that increasing α one is considering a wider range of values to compute the CVaR, and then the result is a value closer to the expected return (note that when α = 1 the expected return is equal to the CVaR). Finally, to conclude with the analysis of model BLIFP, we remark that the smaller the cardinality of the set B the better the CVaR and expected returns for the investor, but the worse the bank net profit. This is clearly expected since we are reducing the number of securities where the bank could charge transaction costs.
We proceed next to analyze the solutions of the second model, namely ILBFP. We observe in Figure 4 the same trend that in the previous model: more risk-averse investments produce bigger profits for the bank. However, contrary to what happens in the previous model, namely BLIFP, we remark that, decreasing the cardinality of the set B results in a reduction of the bank profit.
For the sake of the length of the paper, we do not include in this analysis comparisons of CVaR nor expected returns for the experiments of BLIFP. Additionally, the behavior of these results are similar to those observed in Figures 1 and 3 for the corresponding BLIFP model. The interested reader is referred to the to Appendix A for a full overview of all our results and figures. To finish this section devoted to the analysis of the solutions for our models, we consider the MSWP model. In this case we have only included the comparison of the objective function of this model, namely bank net profit plus CVaR, for the different risk profiles wrt µ 0 and α, and type of market (A, . . . , I). It can be seen in Figure 5 that the sum of the expected profit and the CVaR, i.e. the objective function of the problem, increases with α. One can also observe that for different values of µ 0 the objective values are almost the same. No significant differences are perceived between the different markets for this last model. 
Comparing solutions across models
This last section of the computational results is devoted to compare the solutions provided for the three models considered in this paper, namely BLIFP, ILBFP and MSWP. The goal is to analyze the solution across models with respect to the goals of the two parties: bank net profit, CVaR levels and expected returns. Figure 7 compares the values of the bank profit for the two models and the same risk profiles. It is also remarkable that the BLIFP model always results in higher profit values for all risk profiles and type of instances. In these comparisons we do not include the values for the social welfare model because they are not comparable due to the existence of multiple solutions (with the same value for the objective function but very different balance between the distribution of the CVaR and the bank profit). As we mentioned above, we emphasize that in all our experiments the bank-investor model BLIFP always gives higher profit for the bank, and better CVaR for the investor than the investor-bank model ILBFP.
The last comparisons across models refer to the sum of bank profit + CVaR, in Figure 8 , and expected return, in Figure 9 . These two figures show the values attained by the three models for the different instances (A, . . . , I) and the same four risk profiles that we have already described in the previous cases and in figures 6 and 7. As theoretically proved in Proposition 4 the sum of the bank profit plus the CVaR is always greater for social welfare model MSWP than for the other two, namely BLIFP and ILBFP. To conclude, we compare models with respect to obtained expected returns. Looking at Figure 9 for the comparison of expected returns we can not conclude that there exists a model dominating the others with respect to this criterion and therefore the experiments do not prescribe any preference relationship among the models with respect to this element. The interested reader is referred to the to Appendix B for a full overview of all our results and figures. 
Concluding remarks and extensions
We have presented a single-period transaction costs portfolio optimization problem with two different decision-makers: the investor and the financial institution. Including the financial intermediaries as decisionmakers leads to the incorporation of the transaction costs as decision variables in the portfolio selection problem. The action of both decision-makers was assumed to be hierarchical. This hierarchical structure has been modeled using bilevel optimization. In addition, a social welfare model was also studied.
In all cases, it has been assumed that the financial intermediary had to choose the unit transaction costs, for each security, from a discrete set of prices, maximizing its benefits, and that the investor aimed to minimize the risk (optimizing his CVaR), ensuring a given expected return. In order to solve the three proposed models, MILP and LP formulations, as well as algorithms, have been proposed. By making variations in the sets of prices, and in the parameters to model the CVaR and the expected return, α and µ 0 , different bank and investor profiles can be considered.
In our analysis in sections 2 and 3, all the problems have been presented, for simplicity, with only one follower. Nevertheless, they could be easily extended to more than one. In particular, in Section 2, the problem has been studied from the point of view of the bank, that is, the bank aimed to maximize its benefit by assuming that once the prices for the securities are set, a single investor will choose his portfolio according to the described goals. We remark that the same procedure could be applied for several followers (investors). In fact, in that model, F different profiles of followers (risk averse, risk taker, etc.) could be considered, and the bank's goal would be maximizing the overall benefit for any linear function of its prices. This approach would allow the bank to improve the decision-making process in the cases where the same prices have to be set for all the investors, but different investor's profiles are considered.
A detailed computational study has been conducted using data from the IBEX 35. We have compared the solution methods, the solutions and the risk profiles within models, and the solutions across models. From our computational experience we have observed that the bank-leader investor-follower model result in best solutions for both, the bank and the investor, in comparison with the investor-leader bank-follower model, and also that the social welfare result, as theoretically proved, in higher aggregated benefits. 
